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ENSURING THE SUPREMACY OF
FEDERAL LAW: WHY THE
DISTRICT COURT WAS WRONG IN
WESTSIDE MOTHERS V. HA VEMAN
Erwin Chemerinskyt
IN RECENT YEARS, the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the scope of state sovereign immunity. In Alden v.
Maine, the Court held that sovereign immunity broadly protects
state governments from being sued in state court without their
consent, even to enforce federal laws.1 In Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, the Court greatly limited the ability of Congress to authorize suits against state governments and to override sovereign immunity.2 The Court applied this jurisprudence in the past
couple of years to bar suits against States for patent infringement, 3 for age discrimination, 4 and for disability discrimination.5
Despite the significant expansion in state sovereign immunity, the Court has been adamant that this does not excuse state
violations of federal law. The Court has thus stressed that state
officers can be sued, even though suits against the state are
barred to ensure state compliance with federal law. In its most
recent sovereign immunity decision, Board of Trustees of the

t Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, University of Southern California.
' 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

2 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

3 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank,
526 U.S. 627 (1999) (striking down the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act).
4 See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is not a valid abrogation of
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
5 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (holding that employee suits against the state university under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 were barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
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University of Alabama v. Garrett,6 Chief Justice Rehnquist's

majority opinion was explicit in emphasizing the power to sue
state officers, even though state governments may not be sued:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does
not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal
recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still
prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those
standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte
Young. 7

Now, however, a district court has created very substantial
new exceptions to the ability to sue state officers to enforce federal law. In Westside Mothers v. Haveman,8 a federal district
court in Michigan went much further than any court in the country in restricting the ability to sue federal officers. Simply put,
the district court's ruling is several giant steps to the right of the
Supreme Court, or any other court. This article analyzes the district court's opinion and explains why it is fundamentally wrong
and dangerous to ensuring the supremacy of federal law.
The case involved a suit against state officers for injunctive
relief to remedy violations of a federal statute, Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, 9 which requires the State to provide preventative health care for children. The district court gave two
reasons why the suit against state officers cannot go forward.
First, the court ruled that state officers cannot be sued pursuant
to Ex parte Young, to ensure state compliance with the terms of
federal statutes establishing spending programs. 10 The district
court gave several reasons for this conclusion. Most importantly, the court held that suits against state officers cannot be
brought under Ex parte Young, stating that "congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending Power

. .

. are not the su-

preme law of the land."1 The district court also said that the
6 d

7

l at 968 n.9.

8 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
942 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396v (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
10

133 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62.

'I at 561.
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Eleventh Amendment precluded this suit for injunctive relief
against government officers because "the State of Michigan is
the real defendant in this suit, and the doctrine of Ex Parte
Young does not apply, even though plaintiffs have nominally
named individual state officers as defendants ....

Michigan's

officers share the State's immunity from private suit so long as
they are acting within the lawful authority delegated to them by
the State." 12 In other words, the State is the real party in interest
if its officers act within their lawful authority. The court additionally said that a suit under Ex parte Young is not available
because the statute leaves discretion to the officers in implementing 13 the law and because it has a detailed remedial
scheme.
Second, and independently, the district court held that there
is not a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce
the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act because
"§ 1983 does not create a blanket cause of action for Spending
Power programs operated pursuant to voluntary federal-state
agreements. 14 In other words, the district court said that even if
sovereign immunity did not bar the suit, there still would be no
cause of action under § 1983 to enforce the federal law because
it was a spending program.
Simply put, the district court announced new rules limiting
federal court jurisdiction that, if upheld, would undermine the
enforcement of all conditions created by Congress as part of
federal statutes creating spending programs. If the district court
had followed the clearly established law in this area, then there
should have been no doubt the provisions of the Medicaid law
at issue here were enforceable against individual officers
through a § 1983 action. Instead, by radically changing the law,
the district court articulated an approach that would undermine
the supremacy of a large body of federal law.
Part I of this paper explains why the district court was
wrong in its analysis of Ex parte Young and why suits against
individual officers must be available to enforce laws enacted
under the spending clause. Part II then discusses why the district court erred in its approach to § 1983 and why there is a
cause of action to enforce spending laws, like the Medicaid Act.
12Id at 573-74.
'3 Id at 574-75.
14 Id at 576.
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I. THE WESTSIDE MOTHERS COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO FOLLOW THE LONG-ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLE THAT THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
DOES NOT BAR SUITS AGAINST STATE
OFFICERS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar Suits Against
State Officers for Injunctive Relief
As mentioned above, this case is a suit against state officers
for injunctive relief to remedy violations of a federal statute,
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 15 which requires the State
to provide preventative health care for children. The law is settled and clearly established that state officers may be sued for
injunctive relief, even when the suit enjoins official state policy
and even where the State cannot be named as a defendant. 6
In fact, in its most recent sovereign immunity decision,
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,17 the
Supreme Court expressly declared that state officers may be

sued to enforce Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
even though suits directly against the state government are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Likewise, federal courts of

appeals-such as the Sixth Circuit, which is considering
Westside Mothers v. Haveman on appeal-have consistently and
unequivocally followed Ex parte Young and held that state offi-

cers may be sued for injunctive relief. 18
The importance of this basic principle-that sovereign
immunity does not bar suits against state officers for injunctive
15 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396v (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).

16 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (stating there is "ample
justification for the assertion that individuals, who, as officers of the State, are
clothed with some duty.., to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act,
violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from
such action"); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) ("We
do not... question the continuing validity of the Ex Parte Young doctrine."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("mhe Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United
States."'); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978) (reaffirming that "state officers
are not immune from prospective injunctive relief').
17 121 S.Ct. 955, 968 n.9 (2001).
18Lawson v. Shelby County, 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000); Mich. Bell

Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2000); Futemick v. Sumpter
Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1055 (6th Cir. 1996).
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relief-cannot be overstated. The decision in Ex parte Young
long has been recognized as essential to ensuring state compliance with federal law. As Professor Charles Alan Wright noted,
"the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."' 9
For this reason, Exparte Young has been heralded as 'one of the
three most important decisions the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever handed down.' 20 As the Supreme Court explained, "the availability of prospective relief of the sort
awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law
are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law.'
The principle that government officers can be sued for injunctive relief, even where the government itself cannot be
named as a defendant, can be traced to English law. Although
the King could not be sued, the King's officers could be named
as defendants.22
The United States Supreme Court has followed this principle since the earliest days of American history. For example,
United States v. Peters23 was the first case to interpret the Eleventh Amendment and it expressly held that there is no bar to
suing an individual officer, even where the State has an interest
in the outcome of the suit. In Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,24 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John
Marshall, held that the rule of law requires that suits against
government officers be permitted even where the government is
protected by sovereign immunity. Throughout the 19th century,
the Court adhered to the basic principle that suits against state

19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983).
20 Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 560, 564 (S.D. Ohio

1979) (quoting 17 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 4231 (1978)).

21Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).

22 See 10 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 651 (1938)

(discussing how although no tort could be imputed to the King, his servants could be
held personally answerable); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1963) (concluding that since the thirteenth century it was clearly established that the King's officers could be sued).
23 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139-140 (1809).
24 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 842-44 (1824).
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officers are permitted in circumstances
where the State could
25
not be named as a defendant.
Indeed, Ex parte Young distinguishes between the State and

its officers in much the same way as the common law always

has distinguished between a principal and its agents. 26 For ex-

ample, a corporate officer who is performing acts that the corporation cannot legally authorize "is said to be acting 'ultra vi27
res' or 'beyond the powers' conferred on the corporation.,

Such an officer cannot claim the authority of the corporation.
Similarly, in Young the Court concluded that an officer acting
illegally is stripped of state authority and therefore the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar suits against officers.
B. The District Court Erred in Concluding that the
Eleventh Amendment Barred a Suit Against State Officers

to Ensure Compliance with the Provisions of the Social
Security Act
Against this historical background, the Westside Mothers

court clearly erred in finding the Eleventh Amendment barred
this suit against state officers to ensure compliance with federal
law. In coming to this conclusion, the district court invented
new exceptions to the doctrine of Ex parte Young that have no

basis in the precedents of the Supreme Court, this Court, or any
court in the country.
25 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898) (holding that within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, a suit a against a state officer to prevent him
from enforcing an unconstitutional act is not a suit against the State); ExparteAyers,
123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887) (discussing how individual defendants, under "the color of
the authority of unconstitutional legislation by the state, are guilty of personal trespass"); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883)
(stating that a court does not lose jurisdiction when a government officer "asserts
authority as such officer"); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872) ("Making a State officer a party does not make the State a party, although her law may have
prompted his action, and the State may stand behind him as the real party in interest."); Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 122 (1828)
("[A]lthough the claims of a state may be ultimately affected by the decision of a
cause, yet if the state be not necessarily a defendant, the Courts of the United States
are bound to exercise discretion.").
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958) (distinguishing
authority from other powers); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERS HP § 13 (2d ed. 1979) (distinguishing power and authority).
JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 133 (1987).
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1. Spending Programs Are the Supreme Law of the Land
The first, and perhaps the most important, reason given by
the district court for not following Ex parte Young was its astounding statement that "congressional enactments pursuant to
the Spending Power ...are not the supreme law of the land. 28

The district court flatly declared that the doctrine of Ex Parte
Young "does not 2apply to congressional enactments under the
Spending Power. 9
But statutes creating spending programs, such as the Social
Security Act and its provisions, unquestionably are federal laws.
Nothing in the Constitution's language, or any Supreme Court
precedent, draws a distinction among federal laws, denying
some status as the supreme law of the land. Indeed, the Supreme
Court and every court have recognized that spending statutes
are the supreme law in finding that they preempt conflicting
state and local laws.30
The Supreme Court consistently has expansively defined
the scope of Congress's power under the spending clause. In
United States v. Butler,3 1 the Court held that Congress has broad
power to tax and spend for the general welfare so long as it does
not violate other constitutional provisions.
Subsequent cases affirmed Congress's expansive authority
under the taxing and spending clauses, specifically with regard
to the Social Security Act, which is the statute at issue in
Westside Mothers. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,32 the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the federal unemployment compensation system created by the Social Security Act. In Helvering v. Davis,33 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act's old age pension program, which was sup28Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
29id

30 See Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474,478 (1996)
(enjoining portion of Amendment 68 of the Arkansas Constitution that conflicted
with Medicaid abortion funding); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Engler,
73 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 109a of the Social Welfare Act of
Michigan prohibiting state expenditures to pay for an abortion violated federal law);
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating the Supremacy Clause requires the invalidation of Pennsylvania's Abortion
Control Act because it conflicted with Medicaid).
3'297 U.S. 1 (1936).
32 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
33301 U.S. 619 (1937).

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:139

ported exclusively by federal taxes. Justice Cardozo, writing for
the Court explained:
The discretion [to decide whether taxing and spending
advances the general welfare] belongs to Congress,
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment.... Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be 34
interwoven in
our day with the well-being of the Nation.
No case since the 1930's has limited or even called into question the broad scope of Congress's spending powers.
The district court rests its conclusion that spending programs are not the supreme law of the land on the fact that States
choose whether to participate. It declared that "[c]ongress has
no power to compel the States to participate in voluntary federal
programs like Medicaid., 35 This analysis confuses two different
choices: whether to participate in the federal program and
whether to comply with the requirements of the program once
the State has decided to participate. The former is voluntary, but
the latter is obligatory. A State certainly gets to decide whether
to participate in a federal program like Medicaid; but once it has
made the choice to participate, it must comply with the terms of
that law, just as it must follow all federal laws that apply to it.
As a federal court recently persuasively explained:
[W]e do not agree with the appraisal of laws passed pursuant to the Spending Clause as having inferior dignity
to other laws. Certainly the Supreme Court has not articulated any such distinction; to the contrary, it has
struck down state laws or regulations which violated a
federal welfare statute, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, on the36basis that such laws violated the Supremacy Clause.

34Id.at 640-41.
35 Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561 (E.D. Mich.

2001).
36Boudreau v. Ryan, No. 00 C 5392, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2001),
(citing Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 138 (1982); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S.
598, 600 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285-86 (1971)).
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Indeed, Eleventh Amendment concerns are less weighty in
spending clause cases precisely because States have chosen to
participate. The Supreme Court is understandably most concerned about federalism when Congress is compelling state
government action. 37 In contrast, the Court has been clear that
Congress can induce state government action through the use of
38
its spending powers. For example, in South Dakota v. Dole,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress requiring
States to set an eighteen-year-old drinking age as a condition for
receipt of federal highway money. The difference, of course, is
that with spending programs States get to make a choice, and
once they decide to participate they can be forced to meet the
requirements of the program.
The Westside Mothers court justified its conclusion by
characterizing the Medicaid program as a "contract" between
the federal government and the States. 39 The problem with this
argument is that it takes an analogy literally; Medicaid, as with
other spending programs, is like a contract in that the parties
each have made a voluntary choice to participate, but it is different from a contract in that the terms are set by federal statute
and thus are the supreme law of the land. As the Supreme Court
has explained, in speaking about another spending program:
Although we agree with the State that Title I grant
agreements had a contractual aspect, the program cannot
be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract
governing a discrete transaction.... Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate
in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment
of Congress concerning desirable pub4
lic policy.
The district court's view, if followed, would undermine the enforcement of every federal spending program.
37 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding the backgroundcheck requirements of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the
Tenth Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the
"take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 violated the Tenth Amendment).
38 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
39 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
40 Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985) (citations

omitted).
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2. The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar Suits Against State
Officers Even Though the State Government is the "Real Party
in Interest"
The second reason given by the district court for barring
the suit in Westside Mothers, based on the Eleventh Amendment, was that Michigan was the real party in interest.41 The
court explained that the defendant officers "are acting in their
official capacities within the authority delegated to them by the
them is in reality to be inState, and the relief sought against
42
flicted only against the State.
But this is true in every instance in which a state officer is
sued to enjoin state laws and policies that conflict with federal
law. In Ex parte Young, the State was the real party in interest
because the suit against the Minnesota Attorney General was to
enjoin a state statute limiting railroad rates enacted by the Minnesota legislature and signed into law by its governor.
The Supreme Court consistently has held the Eleventh
Amendment does not prohibit a federal court from giving injunctive relief against a state officer even though compliance
with the injunction will cost the State a great deal of money in
the future.43 In countless instances, the State was the real party
in interest; in all, compliance with the injunction would force
significant state expenditures; and yet in all, the Court held that
there was no Eleventh Amendment bar to the suit against the
officers for injunctive relief.
In Westside Mothers, the suit named state officers as defendants and sought an injunction against them. This is exactly
what Ex parte Young, and countless decisions before and after
it, permits. If the district court is correct that state officers cannot be sued where the State is the real party in interest, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is effectively overruled because it never
could be used to enjoin state laws or policies.
41Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562-74.
42 Id at 573.
43 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (discussing how remedies

designed "to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law," but retrospective relief is not
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289
(1977) (stating federal courts can enjoin state officials conduct notwithstanding a
"direct and substantial impact on the state treasury"); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (holding a court's remedial power is limited to prospective relief, and
may not include a retroactive award).
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3. State Officers Have the Duty to Comply with the Terms of
the Social Security Act
The Westside Mothers court concluded that Ex parte Young
does not apply because federal law accords state officers discretion in making certain choices. The district court stated, "even if
Michigan were obligated to provide all of the services plaintiffs
argue are required . . . the federal laws upon which plaintiffs
rely do not explain how those levels of service are to be
reached, nor do those federal laws
require that the State provide
''
service in a particular manner. 4
This argument commits a basic logical fallacy: it concludes
that everything is discretionary because some things are discretionary. Once the State chooses to participate in the Federal
Medicaid program its officers are required to provide the Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services
(EPSDT) required by federal law. Even though they may make
some choices in how to comply with these mandates, state officers have no discretion as to whether to provide the services
required by federal law. As the Tenth Circuit has explained, Ex
parte Young does not "preclude judicial review of discretionary
acts that violate federal law." 45 Again, if the district court's approach were followed, nothing would remain of Ex parte Young
because virtually every federal mandate leaves some choices to
state officials.
4. The Medicaid Statute Does Not Provide a Detailed Remedial
Scheme that Precludes Suits for Injunctive Relief Under Ex
Parte Young
Finally, the Westside Mothers court concluded that "[t]he
existence of a limited remedy in the Medicaid statute precludes
the use of Ex Parte Young to enforce the statutory scheme by
other means. 4 6 The district court, however, misstated the law
by omitting key words from the Supreme Court, which stated,
"where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme...
a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and

44 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
45 Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of the Interior, 160 F. 3d 602, 611

(10th Cir. 1998).
46 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
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permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young." 4

No other court in the country has held that the Medicaid
law creates a "detailed" remedial scheme or that allowing suits
against state officers to enforce it would "cast aside" limitations
in the law. Quite the contrary, every other court to consider the
issue has rejected this argument.48 As these courts have held,
there is nothing in the Medicaid law that is inconsistent with
enforcement via suits against individual officers. If the Westside
Mothers court's approach were followed, then no suits would be
permitted to enforce this, or countless other, federal statutes.
In conclusion, the Westside Mothers court's opinion calls
into question the very validity of Ex parte Young and the ability
to sue individual officers to enforce federal laws. The district
court's view that there cannot be suits against officers when the
relief effectively is against the State would leave nothing remaining of Ex parte Young. The key mechanism for ensuring
state compliance with federal law, and thus upholding the basic
principle of federal supremacy, would be lost. But even the district court's narrower rationale-that spending programs cannot
be enforced via suits against officers-would mean that States
could disregard the terms of countless federal laws and not need
to worry about enforcement actions. The district court, in its
obvious concern about federalism, forgets one of the most basic
aspects of American federalism: the supremacy of federal law,
which is expressly required by Article VI of the Constitution.

47 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (emphasis added).
48 See Md. Psychiatric Soc'y, Inc. v. Wasserman, 102 F.3d 717, 719 n.* (4th

Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Md.
Cmty. Health Sys., LLP. v. Glendening, 115 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602 (D. Md. 2000).

2002]

ENSURING THE SUPREMACY OF FEDERAL LAW

H. THE WESTSIDE MOTHERS COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO FOLLOW THE CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED LAW THAT THE PROVISIONS OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT ARE
ENFORCEABLE VIA A SUIT UNDER 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
A. The Law Is Clearly Established that the Provisions of the
Social Security Act Are Enforceable Via a Suit Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
The Westside Mothers court also held that there is not a
cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act because "§ 1983
does not create a blanket cause of action for Spending Power
programs operated pursuant to voluntary federal-state agreements. 49 The district court's reasoning, if followed, would
mean that there is no cause of action under § 1983 to enforce
the provisions of the Social Security Act or any other federal
spending program. This would dramatically change the law because the Supreme Court consistently and unequivocally has
held that suits under § 1983 are available to enforce the Social
Security Act and other federal spending programs.
The seminal case concerning the availability of § 1983 to
redress violations of federal statutes is Maine v. Thiboutot,50
which was a suit to enforce provisions of the Social Security
Act concerning the calculation of welfare benefits. The State
argued, as the Westside Mothers court concluded, that § 1983
could not be used to enforce the Social Security Act. The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this argument:
The question before us is whether the phrase "and
laws," as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether
it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that
Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain
language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security
Act.-5

49 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
50 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

5'Id at 4.

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:139

In fact, in Wilder v. Virginia HospitalAss'n,52 the Supreme
Court expressly ruled that the provisions of the Medicaid law,
which are the focus of the Westside Mothers litigation, are enforceable via a § 1983 action. The district court's reasoning,
that contractual agreements cannot be enforced via a § 1983 action, was foreclosed by Wilder's explicit holding that suits to
collect money owed under the terms of federal law are permissible. Courts of Appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, have followed this clearly established law and held that the provisions
of Title XIX of the53 Social Security Act may be enforced
through § 1983 suits.
B. Congress Clearly Intended that the Provisions of the
Social Security Act Be Enforced Through a § 1983 Action
In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing

Authority,5 the Supreme Court held that the presumption is in
favor of the availability of § 1983 to enforce a federal statute.
The Court emphasized that the burden is on the defendant to
demonstrate "by express provision or other specific evidence
from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose [§
1983 litigation]. '
There is nothing in the Social Security Act, its Medicaid
provisions, or any of the legislative history that evidences congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 actions. Quite the contrary,
there have been many attempts to amend the Social Security Act
to preclude § 1983 suits to enforce its provisions, but all have
failed. Congress rejected bills introduced in 1981, 1985, 1987,
and 1996 that would have limited § 1983 precisely as done by
the district court. 56 In 1995, Congress passed a provision that

would have repealed the right to sue under § 1983 to enforce the
Medicaid statute, but President Clinton vetoed it. 57 In Maine v.
52 496 U.S. 498, 501-02, 509-10 (1990).
53 See Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 1998) (challenging
Michigan's Medicaid transportation policy); Linton v. Comm'r of Health and Evn't,
65 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 1995) (challenging Tennessee's implementation of distinct part
certification); Wood v. Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1994) (challenging Ohio's
administration of its Medically Fragile Waiver program).
A479 U.S. 418 (1987).

5 Id. at 423.
56 See H.R. 4314, 104th Cong. § 309(a) (1996); S. 325, 100th Cong. (1987);
S. 436, 99th Cong. (1985); S.584, 97th Cong. (1981).
57 The House Budget Committee stated "[tihe bill would remove the existing
right of an applicant, beneficiary, provider, or health plan to sue a State official under
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Thiboutot,58 the Court invited the legislative process to change

the law if it thought the Court's interpretation of congressional
intent was in error. The failure of the legislative process to do
so, despite many attempts, is a clear indication that the provisions of the Social Security Act are enforceable via a §1983 action.
Moreover, the one time the Supreme Court found a provision of the Social Security Act to be non-enforceable via a §
1983 action, Congress immediately overturned that decision by
statute. In Suter v. Artist M., the Court held that § 1983 could
not be used to enforce the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.59 Congress quickly adopted a law, 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-2, to reestablish the private right of action as it existed
before this decision. 60 The statute adopted after Suter represents

a clear Congressional re-endorsement of Maine v. Thiboutot's
holding that the provisions of the Social Security Act are enforceable through a § 1983 action.

42 U.S.C 1983 to require prospective enforcement of the Medicaid statute." H.R.
REP. No. 104-280, at 639 (1995).
58448 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
59 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
60
See H.R. CoNF. REP.No. 102-1034 (1992) (stating the purpose of the bill
"is to assure that individuals who have been injured by a States failure to comply
with the Federal mandates of the State plan titles of the Social Security Act are able
to seek redress in the federal courts to the extent they were able to prior to the decision in Suter v. Artist M."). I note that I played some part in helping in the drafting of
this language. It is a fascinating story of the legislative process at work. The Senate
Finance Committee held a hearing in the fall of 1992 after Suter v. ArtistM. had been
decided. There were four witnesses at the hearing: representatives of the Attorney
General's offices from Illinois (who had argued Suter in the Supreme Court) and
Florida; James Wild, then of the Children's Defense Fund; and me. After the four
witnesses made their statements and were asked some questions, a bell went off.
Senator Moynihan, who was presiding, said that the Senators had to go to a floor
vote. He asked each of us when our plane was to go home. None of us had a flight for
several hours. He asked us to go with his staff to try and draft some language. So the
four witnesses accompanied the staff to what was literally a back room off the hearing room. We were followed by a group of lobbyists. The witnesses and the staff sat
around the table and the lobbyists sat around the room behind us. We actually drafted
some language. (I still have the sheet of legal paper where I scribbled an idea for
some of it.) The language we drafted was the basis for a provision that the Senate
passed. It was put in a bill that President George Bush vetoed in November 1992. The
new Congress passed it and President Clinton signed it into law.
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C. Under the Test Articulated By the Supreme Court, the
Provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act Are

Enforceable Via § 1983 Action
The Supreme Court has held that a statute creates rights

enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if: (1) 'the provision in
question was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff;' 61 (2)
the statute imposes "a binding obligation on the government
unit" rather than "reflects merely a 'congressional preference'
for a certain kind of conduct;" 62 and (3) the interest asserted is
not "'too vague and amorphous' such that it is 'beyond the
competence of the judiciary to enforce."' 63 The district court
wrongly ignored this test and relied instead on Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police,64 which did not even involve the
of whether § 1983 can be used to enforce federal statquestion
65
utes.

Under this three-part test, which is controlling in deciding
whether a suit can be brought under § 1983 to enforce a federal
law, there can be no doubt that the Medicaid provisions of the

Social Security Act are enforceable via a § 1983 action. First, as
many courts have expressly recognized, children are the inDiagtended beneficiaries of the Early and Periodic Screening,
66
nosis, and Treatment Services provisions of the law.
Second, these provisions of the Social Security Act are
binding upon States participating in the Medicaid program. The

statutory language is unequivocal that States "shall" provide
these services and that the requirement is "mandatory" upon

61 Wilder

v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (quoting Golden State

Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
62 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. V. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19
(1981)).

63

Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106

(1989)).
64 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The issue in Will was whether a state government can
be named as a defendant in a § 1983 suit in state court. Id. This case has no application here where it is a § 1983 suit pursuant to Exparte Young against state officers in
federal court.
65 Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
6 Dajour B. v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 2044 (JGK), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10251, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2001); see Miller ex rel. Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993); Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 342 n.7
(5th Cir. 1983); Antrican v. Buell, 158 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672-73 (E.D.N.C. 2001);
Frew v. Gilbert, 109 F. Supp. 2d 579, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
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them. 67 Thus, courts have properly concluded that "it is clear..
that the Department has a binding obligation" to provide preventative health care services to a Medicaid eligible child.68
Third, the provisions that Westside Mothers had cited in
their complaint are not too vague to be enforced. The statutory
duties are clearly stated and thus courts consistently have found
that thea, are sufficiently specific to be enforceable via a § 1983
action.
If the Westside Mothers court had applied the proper test,
as prescribed by the United States Supreme Court, there is no
doubt that it would have had to conclude that a cause of action
exists under § 1983 to enforce the contested provisions of Title
XIX of the Social Security Act. Instead, the district court created a new and unprecedented rule that would dramatically
change the law in holding that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce
federal spending programs. Congress could, if it wished to do
so, create such a law, but it is not for the courts to do.

CONCLUSION
It may seem unusual to devote an entire article to analyzing
one district court's opinion, especially before the appellatd court
even has had the opportunity to consider it. Yet, for many reasons the district court's opinion in Westside Mothers v. Haveman7° warrants this attention.
The case involves basic principles of American law, especially the ability to ensure the supremacy of federal law. Ultimately, the issue is about holding government accountable. Can
state governments violate the terms of federal statutes with impunity? If the district court's view is accepted, then there will
be no way to enforce in court any federal statute that creates a
spending program. This, of course, would encourage state govSee 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(1) (West Supp. 2001) ("A State plan for medical assistance must - provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of
the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them."), § 1396a(a)(8)
(mandating that all individuals wishing to apply for assistance shall have the opportunity to do so and assistance shall be provided with reasonable promptness), §
1396a(10)(A) (listing those qualified for medial assistance under state plans), §
1396a(a)(43) (mandating required procedures concerning early periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment services).
68 Miller ex rel. Miller, 10 F.3d at 1319.
69
See Antrican, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 670; DajourB., No. 00 Civ. 2044 (JGK),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10251, at *26; Frew, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
70 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
67
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ernments to ignore the terms of federal statutes. The federal
government theoretically still could enforce the laws by cutting
off funds to non-complying States. But such fund cutoffs rarely
occur and besides, it only makes things worse as the beneficiaries in need are denied all funds.
This is a time of greatly renewed emphasis on federalism
by the United States Supreme Court. I have no doubt that the
Rehnquist Court will be most remembered for its revival of federalism as a limit on federal power. The Court has narrowed the
scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment; used the Tenth
Amendment as a limit on federal authority; and significantly
expanded state sovereign immunity. All of this has occurred in
the last decade-much in just the last five years. Therefore, it is
uncertain how far the federalism revolution will go in limiting
federal powers in the name of protecting States' rights.
It is precisely for this reason that the district court's decision in Westside Mothers is so dangerous and so important. This
district court has gone much further than any other court in
pushing to restrict federal court power and greatly expand state
immunity to suit. That is why it is so important to examine the
decision carefully and explain why the decision is fundamentally wrong about the law and even more about basic principles
of American government.
Forgotten in all of this, unfortunately, is the reality that this
litigation is about making sure that children get preventative
medical care. With all of the technical arguments about jurisdiction, Ex parte Young, and § 1983, it is easy to forget that this
case concerns preventing children from becoming ill and providing essential medical care. The State of Michigan took federal money for this purpose and is violating its statutory obligations.
The Sixth Circuit should reverse the district court and explain all of the reasons why the district court erred. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court should reaffirm the basic principles implicated by this litigation: state officers may be sued to enforce
federal laws to ensure compliance with their terms and that, of
course, includes spending laws.

